We study government interventions in a dynamic market with asymmetric information. We show that restricting trading opportunities after an initial round of trade is always optimal. Under a su¢ cient condition it is optimal to subsidize trades only at time zero while imposing prohibitively high taxes afterwards. If interventions are required to generate a Pareto improvement over laissez-faire then trade is only restricted for a short amount of time. If additional sellers can arrive later, then, the optimal policy is to set price controls. Subsidies can greatly enhance welfare but can be detrimental if provided with delay.
Introduction
During times of …nancial distress, such as those experienced in 2008 after the demise of Lehman Brothers, asset sales are an important source of funds for …nancial institutions such as banks and insurance companies. Unfortunately, the big gains from trade between those that are liquidity constrained and those that are not may be di¢ cult to realize due to asymmetric information. As in the classic Akerlof (1970) 
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were to pay the price corresponding to the average quality of the assets in the market, sellers holding the best assets might not wish to trade. Realizing this, buyers would then reduce their o¤ers and end up trading with a small fraction of the sellers or none at all. Absent government intervention, trade either completely stops or slows down, with prices gradually rising and over time better and better assets being traded in the market.
The main questions we seek to answer in this paper are if and how should the government intervene in these situations, even if it has a binding budget constraint. We answer them in We …rst characterize the laissez-faire equilibrium (Proposition 1). Having a continuum of seller types competitive buyers and continous time leads to a very tractable equilibrium. It is characterized by a smooth ‡ow of trade where worst assets are sold …rst and both the quality of traded assets and price gradually increase over time.
Our …rst policy result (Lemma 1) is that, introducing high taxes for an interval of time, > 0; after an initial round of, potentially subsidized, trade is always part of optimal policy. By taxing future trades, the government creates more incentives to trade in the early taxexempt period. In particular, holders of higher quality assets that would delay trade absent the government policy now prefer to trade earlier in order to avoid the taxes or excessive delay. As the quality of the pool of assets sold early improves, market price increases as well.
Higher prices in turn induce even more trade creating a virtuous cycle.
Our second policy result (Theorem 1) shows that under a su¢ cient regularity condition on the shape of the gains from trade and the distribution of asset values, it is optimal to allow only one (potentially subsidized) round of trade at time zero while imposing prohibitively high taxes afterwards (i.e. setting = 1). Intuitively, the regularity condition implies that the ratio of the marginal gains from trade to the marginal information rents of the seller is decreasing in asset quality. Under this condition, the solution to the optimization problem has a bang-bang property: it is optimal to push as much trade as possible to take place immediately even if it comes at the expense of excluding all higher types from trade altogether. 1 Since the optimal policy e¤ectively excludes higher types from trading, these types are worse o¤ than they would be in the laissez-faire equilibrium. An important question and our most novel results come from analyzing optimal policy subject to making all players better o¤ than in the laissez-faire benchmark. We show than in this case it is still always optimal to e¤ectively close the market for some time after the initial round of trade. Under the similar regularity condition of Theorem 1, in Theorem 2 we show that the optimal intervention in this case involves an initial round of trade followed by a short period of high taxes, followed again by trading with no taxes. Thus, while types below a threshold pool to trade at time 0; types above trade at the same times and terms as in the laissez-faire economy.
In Section 5.1 we extend the model by allowing for additional distressed sellers to arrive over time. The optimal policy in this case (see Theorem 3) does not shut down the market.
Instead, the optimal policy can be decentralized by controling market prices. Indeed, by allowing for just one constant price in the market, the buyers e¤ectively face a take it or leave it o¤er whenever they arrive. As in Theorem 1 buyers either trade immediately upon arrival or never trade. Again, they key for e¢ ciency stems from the fact that by restricting the attractiveness of waiting (the terms of trade do not get better) sellers bunch thus reducing the adverse selection problem.
Throughout we allow the government to carry out non-budget neutral interventions. This is important for both normative and positive considerations. We show that there can be big returns from spending some resources in bailing out these markets: even if raising a dollar in revenues from another market induces some deadweight loss, it may still be optimal to bailout these markets. This is best illustrated by showing that in certain cases even with the best budget-neutral intervention the market completely unravels (see Section 4.4) . By providing an initial subsidy the government is able to jump-start the market and greatly increase the overall surplus.
Our results in Section 5.3 stress the importance of acting quickly. Via a series of examples we demonstrate that the timing of the subsidies is crucial. If the government moves slowly and the subsidy is expected to arrive in the future (either deterministically or stochastically) then it can actually have a negative e¤ect on welfare. The intuition is that the expectation of future subsidies delays current trade. So, although there is clearly a bene…t from subsidizing trades, it is of the essence that the government acts fast. While the ‡exibility of the Federal Reserve and its ability to act fast was likely crucial in the recent crisis, some of the uncertainty over future interventions/subsidies may have contributed to the reduction in trade volume in private markets.
Lastly, we note that the exact form of the subsidy is not important, as long as the information rents collected by the di¤erent seller types are unchanged (and transaction costs are the same). A proportional subsidy, as assumed for concreteness in the paper, or a government guarantee on the payo¤ of the assets, as implemented during the crisis with the Public-Private Investment Program for Legacy Assets, would have equivalent e¤ects. Outright purchases of assets, as implemented with the TARP program, would also be equivalent, but only if the program budgeting accounted for the expected future proceeds from the assets purchased by the government. For example, a subsidy program with a budget b is equivalent to a purchase program with a budget b; if the budget in the latter case is on net losses from the program and not on total purchases. 2
Related Literature
Optimal government interventions in similar models have been studied recently by Philippon and Skreta (2012) and Tirole (2012) . In these papers, the government o¤ers …nancing to …rms having an investment opportunity and it is secured by assets that the …rms have private information about (these are sellers in our model -using an asset as a collateral or selling it to obtain …nancing are essentially economically equivalent). That round of government …nancing is followed by a static competitive market in which …rms that did not receive funds from the government can raise funds in a private market. This creates a problem of "mechanism design with a competitive fringe" as named by Philippon and Skreta (2012) : the 2 That assumes that the government holding the assets to maturity is as e¢ cient as private buyers holding the asset. If not, then after purchasing the assets the government should pool them into a portfolio and sell shares of the portfolio to buyers with liquidity. Since the government can commit to pool all of the assets, there would be no (additional) adverse selection problem in creation and sales of the portfolio. government intervention a¤ects the post-intervention equilibrium and vice versa (a feature shared by our model). In sharp contrast to our results, both papers show that tampering with the private markets does not improve welfare: see Proposition 2 in Tirole (2012) and Theorem 2 in Philippon and Skreta (2012) . Since the post-intervention market creates endogenous IR constraints for the agents participating in the government program, making the market less attractive could make it easier for the government to intervene. However, these two papers argue that this is never a good idea.
The key di¤erence between our model and these two papers that leads to these opposing results is that Philippon and Skreta (2012) and Tirole (2012) assume a static model of the private market, while we study a dynamic market. It is best seen in the light of our Theorem 1/Proposition 2: under the regularity condition, it is indeed optimal to have government subsidy at time zero and all trade happening at time zero, with no additional trades in the future. Beyond this crucial di¤erence in results and their practical interpretation, our paper di¤ers from these two papers in terms of the focus on the dynamics of trade and the tradeo¤s in dynamic interventions. Lemma 1 and the bang-bang property of the optimal intervention in Theorem 1 are mathematically related to the …ndings of Samuelson (1984) . In a static setting he shows that the optimal budget-neutral mechanism divides sellers into at most three groups: a group that trades with probably one, a group that trades with a common intermediate probability and a group that does not trade. In our dynamic setting this translates respectively to a group that trades immediately, a group that trades with delay and a group that never trades. Our Theorem 1 contributes to his result by establishing a su¢ cient condition for the optimal mechanism having trade only at t = 0. Moreover, we show how the optimal direct revelation mechanism can be implemented in a decentralized market with a particular government policy that induces a unique competitive equilibrium. In addition, we also extend the prior results by allowing for non budget-neutral interventions.
Our result on Pareto improving interventions has a historical connection to the political economy models of reform with consensus or mayority voting. 3 Within this literature the closest paper is Brusco and Hopenhayn (2007) . They look at the problem of eliminating an ine¢ cient regulation such as trade barrier that keeps unproductive …rms in business. Firms are privately informed about their production costs and the optimal policy determines when such …rms must be shut down. One di¤erence with our model is that we have correlated values between sellers and buyers while in theirs the value to the consumers is independent of the production cost. 4 Their main result with commitment has …rms exiting at most at two times. This is similar to our Lemma 1 note however that the right comparison is Theorem 2 where we require the improvement to be Pareto. In this case, under the regularity condition, we have that a subset of types trade at time zero but then all other types perfectly separate from each other. Thus our results although related are quite di¤erent.
Two related papers, Heider, Hoerova and Holthausen (2009) and Bolton, Santos and Scheinkman (2011), combine the problem of adverse selection with one of maturity mismatch.
Although we do not model the maturity mismatch problem explicitly, we believe it had an important role in the recent crisis and our liquidity-constrained sellers likely are in that situation because of it. That is, we see the maturity mismatch problem as a possible micro-foundation of our model of gains from trade and asymmetric information. Heider, Hoerova & Holthausen (2009) have a 3 period model of the interbank market. Banks in need of liquidity can use the interbank market to borrow from those with excess liquidity.
Asymmetric information about the quality of the assets in the borrower's balance sheets makes lenders afraid of lending to a "lemon"leading to a reduction or complete disappearance of credit. They discuss some policy interventions but their focus is positive rather than normative and essentially static. 5 On the theoretical side, our paper is also related to literature on dynamic markets with adverse selection. The closest paper is Janssen and Roy (2002) who study competitive equilibria in a market that opens at a …xed frequency. They show that in equilibrium prices increase over time and eventually every type trades. They do not ask market design or policy questions as we do in this paper. Yet, we share with their model the observation that dynamic trading leads to more and more types trading over time. Camargo and Lester (2013) …nd the same equilibrium dynamics in a setting with decentralized search rather than a competitive market (in discrete time, with two types of the seller). While their paper is focused on characterizing the set of equilibria of the game with no government intervention, they also show that sunset provisions for subsidies can increase bene…ts of government subsidies because, for reasons similar to what we describe in this paper, expectation of future 
The Model
There is a mass of size one of …nancially distressed banks (the sellers). Each seller owns one unit of an indivisible asset. When the seller holds the asset, it generates for him a revenue stream with net present value c 2 [0; 1] that is private information of the seller. The seller types, c; are distributed according to F (c) ; which is common knowledge, atomless and has a continuous, strictly positive density f (c). We assume that the private information is never revealed. 6 6 Most of our results can be extended to a setting in which at some deterministic or random time the private information becomes public, but the players cannot contract on the realization of this information There is a competitive market of potential buyers. Each buyer values the asset at v (c) which is strictly increasing, twice continuously di¤erentiable, and satis…es v (c) > c for all c 2 (0; 1) ; v (0) 0; and v (1) = 1 (i.e. no gap on the top). 7 Time is t 2 [0; 1] and the market is continuously open. There is also a benevolent government that can intervene by subsidizing or taxing trades proportionally. 8 The government publicly commits to a path of taxes t for t 2 [0; 1] before the market opens at t = 0: If at time t buyers pay price p t ; the sellers receive p t (1 t ) ; t < 0 represents a subsidy. All players discount payo¤s at a rate r: If bank with type c sells at time t at a price p t ; its payo¤ is
and the buyer's payo¤ at the time of purchase is:
Given a path of prices and taxes, the sellers face an optimal stopping problem. Namely, when to sell and collect p t (1 t ) :
Since the stopping problem is supermodular in c and x; if seller of type c has an optimal stopping time t then all types c 0 < c have optimal stopping times t 0 t (even if the optimal stopping time for some types is not unique). The intuition is that the lower types get the same payo¤ from selling as type c; but forego less of future cash ‡ows. This is known as the "skimming property" and it simpli…es equilibrium analysis since in equilibrium the set of seller types remaining in the market at any time is a truncation of the original seller distribution.
Let x (c) be some selection of the optimal stopping times given the net-price process, (see the working paper Fuchs and Skrzypacz 2013). While the cash ‡ows generated by the asset (which are correlated with c) are realized by the buyer, we assume that the buyer and the seller cannot contract on their realization, i.e., we assume that the seller cannot o¤er warranty contracts on the assets he sells. 7 Assuming v (1) = 1 allows us not to worry about out-of-equilibrium beliefs after a history where all sellers were supposed to trade but some did not trade. The equilibria we characterize in this paper continue to exist even if v (1) > 1 but may no longer be unique. A monotonicity condition on beliefs would select this equilibrium. 8 As discussed in Remark 2, the exact form of the subsidy turns out not to matter. p t (1 t ) : 9 Let k t denote the lowest quality asset that has not been traded by time t :
Note that k t is left-continuous and it is independent of the selection of the optimal stopping times (since for any t at most zero measure of types are indi¤erent between stopping at that time and some other time).
We use K t to describe the (set of) types that trade at t: There are three possibilities: (i) if k t is constant to the right of t; that means there is no trade at t; and we denote it by K t = ;;
(ii) if k t increases continuously to the right of t; it means trade is smooth at t; and we denote it by K t = k t ; (iii) if k t jumps discontinuously from k t to k t + = lim s!t+ k s ; it means that there is an atom of trade at t; and we denote by K t = [k t ; k t + ] : 10
With this notation we de…ne a competitive equilibrium:
De…nition 1 Given a tax schedule f t g ; a competitive equilibrium is a pair of functions fp t ; k t g for t 0 that satisfy:
(E2) Seller Optimality: Sellers optimally choose their stopping times (i.e., k t is consistent with seller optimization given p t and t ).
(E3) Market Clearing: for all t; p t v (k t ).
Conditions (E1) and (E2) are standard. Condition (E3) deserves a bit of explanation.
It is needed because condition (E1) provides no discipline when K t = ;: We justify it by a market clearing reasoning, that is, that given the market prices demand equals supply.
Suppose at some t the assets were o¤ered at p t < v (k t ) : Then, since all buyers believe that the value of the asset is at least v (k t ) ; they would all demand it. Demand would not equal supply and the market would not clear. 11 This condition removes some trivial multiplicity of equilibria. For example, it removes as a candidate equilibrium the path (p t ; k t ) = (0; 0) for all periods (i.e. no trade and very low prices) even though this path satis…es the …rst two conditions. 12 9 To assure the stopping problem has a solution, we restrict t to be such that we can construct equilibrium p t so that p t (1 t ) is right-continuous when it is increasing and left-continuous when it is decreasing. 10 We use the notation k t + ; p t + ; etc., to denote right-limits of the corresponding functions at t. 11 We thank Andrew Postlewaite for pointing this out to us. 12 Condition (E3) is analogous to the condition (iv) in Janssen and Roy (2002) and is weaker than the No Unrealized Deals condition in Daley and Green (2012) (see De…nition 2.1 there; since they study the gap case, they need a stronger condition to account for out-of-equilibrium beliefs).
We assume that all market participants publicly observe all the trades. Hence, once a buyer purchases an asset, if he tries to put it back on the market, the market makes a correct inference about c based on the history. Since we assume that all buyers have the same value of the asset, there would not be any pro…table re-trading of the asset (after the initial seller transacts) and hence we ignore that possibility.
Laissez-faire Equilibrium
Absent government interventions, i.e., if t = 0 for all t; the equilibrium has no atoms of trade and is given by:
Proposition 1 (laissez-faire) If t = 0 for all t then there exists a unique competitive equilibrium that is the unique solution to:
To see the intuition (proof is in the appendix), note that if an interval of types traded at time t; Condition (E3) would require that an instant later p t + v (k t + ) : However, that would imply a jump in prices at t since
no type would trade the instant before the jump. Hence, k t is a continuous function in equilibrium. Therefore, by Condition (E1); p t = v (k t ) when there is trade. The di¤erential equation for k t comes from seller optimality: at each point in time, the current cuto¤ type k t must be indi¤erent between trading or delaying trade for an instant. The gain from waiting for an instant of time is that prices rise over time while the cost of delaying trade is the lost interest on the gains from trade. Together:
Using p t = v (k t ) ; this tradeo¤ can be stated as:
This di¤erential equation, together with the boundary condition k 0 = 0; pins down the equilibrium path of k t .
We obtain this remarkably simple characterization of the equilibrium in a dynamic market with adverse selection thanks to a combination of assumptions: continuous time, continuum of types and frictionless competitive buyers market. Without it, equilibrium would not be fully separating, would be typically hard to characterize and the model could have multiple equilibria. For example, if time is discrete, in every period an atom of types would trade and there would be in general a multiplicity of equilibria (as in Janssen and Roy 2002).
Note that if v (0) = 0 (i.e. no strict gains from trade in the bottom of the distribution),
there is no trade in equilibrium. 13 Moreover, the dynamics of (p t ; k t ) in the laissez-faire equilibrium do not depend on the shape of the distribution F (c) but only on its support.
The shape of F (c) will play a role once we introduce government interventions that generate atoms of trade. Finally, total surplus/gains from trade in the laissez-faire equilibrium are:
and hence S LF is independent of the discount factor (since c and v (c) are present values, the …rst-best surplus is independent of r as well). The intuition is that since in equilibrium all types eventually trade, the deadweight loss is due to the delay of trade. While a smaller discount implies that any …xed delay is less costly, by condition (3) a smaller r implies more delay. Since the speed of trading, _ k t ; is proportional to r; these two forces cancel each other out.
Government Interventions: Motivating Examples
We start with the following benchmark example to illustrate the bene…ts of imposing future taxes to increase early trading. Assume c is distributed uniformly over [0 ; 1] and v (c) = 1+c 2 ; as illustrated in Figure 1 . 
Laissez-faire Economy
Absent any government interventions in this example the equilibrium cuto¤s are:
The total surplus in the laissez-faire economy is:
Note that even though asymptotically all types trade in equilibrium, the equilibrium is ine¢ cient due to delay. The …rst-best has all types trading immediately (i.e.t (c) = 0) and surplus is
Initial Subsidy Followed by Constant Permanent Tax
Now consider the following government intervention. The government provides an initial subsidy s = 0 0 per unit traded at time 0 and then …nances this subsidy with a constant tax rate t = for t > 0; to (dynamically) achieve budget balance. One interpretation of this intervention is that the government levies a constant tax rate on the market to …nance a subsidized auction at time 0:
To construct the equilibrium we solve the following …xed point problem. We …rst solve for the equilibrium for any s and : Then, we look for pairs of (s; ) that are budget neutral.
The amount of initial trade depends on the initial subsidy; how much of a subsidy can be provided depends on the amount of trade after t > 0 which, in turn, is a function of which types trade at t = 0: 
Dynamics
In Figure 2 we plot equilibrium cuto¤s, k t ; for di¤erent tax rates: the dashed line has = 15%, the solid line = 5% and the dotted line has = 0%: As shown, a higher tax rate leads to a higher initial cuto¤ but slower trade thereafter. In other words, as taxes increase, there is a tradeo¤ between trading faster with the lower types at the expense of slower trade with higher types.
How does the total surplus change with ? Somewhat surprisingly, even if the taxes are levied but not used for the initial subsidy (i.e. if s = 0 but > 0); the surplus is also increasing in ; as shown by the dashed line in Figure 3 . Comparing the two curves, for small tax rates, the initial subsidy has a large contribution to the welfare gains; yet, for large tax rates the di¤erence is small. The reason is that for high tax rates the La¤er Curve implies that total tax revenues decrease in the tax rate and hence the subsidy becomes again small. The main e¤ect of taxes is then that they push more sellers to participate in the initial tax-exempt auction, and that improves e¢ ciency.
Optimal Government Interventions
In this section we return to our general model and provide two results. First, we show that for general F (c) and v (c) that optimal policy will always include high taxes for some time after time t = 0: This e¤ectively closes the market for t 2 (0; ) and induces bunching of trades at time t = 0. Importantly, as more seller types sell at time t = 0 the equilibrium price must increase inducing even more trade. Under a regularity condition on F (c) and v (c) ; we characterize the optimal interventions for a zero (and positive) budget constraint.
It involves using all the resources to subsidize trade at t = 0 and setting = 1 e¤ectively allowing only one opportunity to trade.
Partial Market Closure is Always Optimal
The following result captures the central idea of this paper. Restricting the opportunities to trade for some times is always part of optimal policy.
Lemma 1
Suppose v (0) > 0: For every r; F (c) ; and v (c) ; there exists > 0 such that it is optimal for the government to set su¢ ciently high taxes for t 2 (0; ) so that there is no trade during that time.
Our proof (for details see the proof of Theorem 1 in the Appendix) considers a mechanism design problem with a market designer who maximizes expected gains from trade. The designer is allowed to cross-subsidize sellers trading in di¤erent periods but has to satisfy its budget constraint on average.
Letting G t (c) denote, for a given type, the (cumulative) distribution over times of trade, the expected discounted time to trade for this type is:
and since all the traders are risk-neutral, their expected payo¤s depend on G t (c) only via
x (c) : In terms of x (c) our claim basically says that x (c) will have a jump from 1 to some value strictly lower than 1:
In the direct revelation mechanism the designer chooses x (c) and a net transfer to type c;
subject to the budget constraint:
where b 0 is the government's budget; the truth-telling constraint:
and individual rationality for the seller. Budget constraint (5) incorporates the goverment's option to either hold the assets to maturity or sell them to the buyers at a fair price,
Truth-telling implies that the equilibrium payo¤ of type c; U (c) ; has to satisfy U 0 (c) =
(1 x (c)) almost everywhere: We use this to express the budget constraint in terms of the allocation only, x (c) :
The …rst term is the amount of money the mechanism designer can collect from the buyers and the second term is the information rent he has to pay the sellers so that they report their types truthfully.
We can then write out the Lagrangean for the problem and maximize pointwise with respect to x (c) : When we do that, the …rst order condition with respect to x (c) is:
where > 0 is the Lagrange multiplier.
To prove our claim we must show that x (c) cannot decrease continuously. Indeed, we can show something stronger, x (c) can take at most three values f0; ; 1g : 14 Notice …rst that
Since incentive compatibility also requires that
x (c) be monotonically decreasing it is thus clearly optimal to set x value for x (c) ; 2 ; we would need another such region (c 0 l ; c 0 h ) where c 0 l > c h . Notice that the monotonicity condition requires 1 2 . We argue next that they cannot both be distinct and in (0; 1) : Consider how each of these regions a¤ects the budget constraint. If the …rst region a¤ected it positively then it would be optimal to set 1 = 1 since it would contribute both to the objective and simultaneously relax the budget constraint. Thus, its impact on the budget must be negative. Similarly consider the impact of the second region on the constraint: If it is weakly positive then it would be optimal to set 2 = 1 . If instead the contribution where negative, it would be optimal to set 2 = 0: In either case we have shown that in the optimal there would never be two distinct interior values for x (c). Generically, there will only be contably many regions of c such that the average value of L (c) is 0: The arguments above can be easily extended beyond two such regions. Thus, the market will be opened at time 0 then closed at least for an amount of time > 0 such that = e r :
We required for the result that v (0) > 0: If v (0) = 0 whether x (0) = 1 or x (0) = 0 (implying there is no trade possible even with the optimal mechanism) depends on the 
When Extreme Policy is Optimal
We showed so far that a closing the market for a potentially short amount of time is always part of an optimal policy. We next show that under a regularity condition the optimal policy calls for = 1: That is, e¤ectively allowing trade only once. Importantly, L (c) crosses zero only once under our regularity condition. That, in turn, is a su¢ cient condition for the optimal solution to have a bang-bang property: types below a threshold trade immediately and types above the threshold never trade. That solution can be implemented by a competitive equilibrium imposing su¢ ciently high taxes after the initial trade. Given these taxes, if the regularity condition holds strictly, the equilibrium is unique. Hence this extreme intervention is the most e¢ cient. 15 15 Details of the proof are in the appendix. The proof uses standard mechanism design tools, similar to Samuelson (1984) in a static environment. The contribution of our proof is to apply these methods to characterize optimal intervention in a dynamic market. On the technical side, we contribute by establishing a su¢ cient condition for the optimal mechanism having trade only at t = 0; and showing that the described policy induces a unique competitive equilibrium that implements the outcome of the optimal direct revelation mechanism.
Theorem 1 If the environment is regular, a competitive equilibrium for a tax policy Moreover, if the environment is strictly regular, the competitive equilibrium for this tax policy is unique.
Our two results in this Section are in stark contrast to recent results in the literature.
Optimal government interventions in similar models (although, admittedly richer) have been studied recently by Philippon and Skreta (2012) and Tirole (2012) . In these papers, the government o¤ers …nancing to …rms having an investment opportunity and it is secured by assets that the …rms have private information about. That intervention is followed by a static competitive market in which …rms that did not receive funds from the government can trade in a private market to raise funds. This creates a problem of "mechanism design with a competitive fringe" as named by Philippon and Skreta (2012) : the government intervention a¤ects the post-intervention equilibrium and vice versa. This e¤ect is shared by our model:
in our example from Section 3 the amount of trade at t = 0 depends on the price after the taxes are removed and that in turn depends on which types trade at time 0:
Both papers obtain a result that shutting down the private market does not improve welfare: see Proposition 2 in Tirole (2012) and Theorem 2 in Philippon and Skreta (2012). Since the post-intervention market creates endogenous IR constraints for the agents participating in the government program, making the market less attractive could make it easier for the government to intervene. However, these two papers argue that this is never a good idea.
As hinted by our benchmark example and generalized in Theorems 1 and 2, taking into account the dynamic nature of the market changes this conclusion. The key di¤erence in the models that leads to these opposing results is that both Philippon and Skreta (2012) and Tirole (2012) assume a static model of the private market, while we study a dynamic market. In our example setting tax rate prohibitively high so that all trade takes place at t = 0 turns out to be equivalent to assuming that the private market is opened only once after the government intervention, as in their papers. Theorem 1 showed that some shut-down is always optimal and Theorem 2 showed that under our regularity condition a complete shutdown is optimal within our model.
Pareto Improving Interventions
It is worth noting that the optimal intervention which was evaluated from an ex-ante perspective generally makes low types better o¤ than in laissez faire but makes high types worse o¤. High types would have eventually traded but with the intervention they do not trade.
A natural question to ask then is what is the optimal government intervention that would make all types weakly better o¤ than their laissez faire outcome. This is a hard problem because the standard mechanism design approach does not work well in this case. These new constraints, which we incorporate as IR constraints, do not allow us to do simple pointwise maximization.
As a …rst step it is worth noting that having a short period of length with high taxes can lead to a Pareto improvement over the laissez faire. The market closure generates bunching of trades at t = 0; which in turn leads to higher prices and even more trade. This positive feedback e¤ect leads to more trade at t = 0 with the closure than one would get at t = without the closure. 16 This is illustrated in the Figure 4 below. For short closures, the solid line representing the cuto¤ at time zero is above the laissez faire cuto¤ (dashed line). Importantly, since after time there are no more taxes, the di¤erential equation for k t is exactly the same as in the laissez faire economy except, only the innitial condition at time t = di¤ers: with the closure, the cuto¤ at t = ; which we denote by ; is higher than that without the closure, which we denote by k LF . Thus, all types higher than are strictly better o¤ since they trade at the same prices as in the laissez faire economy but sooner. Type is no worse o¤ by pooling since it could wait until and trade at v ( ) :
Lastly, all types k < are worse o¤ than type in the laissez faire economy but get the same payo¤ as type with the short closure and thus are strictly better o¤ with the intervention. Therefore, this policy is a Pareto improvement.
Formally we consider the following tax policy:
That is, there is tax-exempt trading at t = 0; followed by a (short) time interval in which transactions are taxed at a high rare such that no type wants to trade, after which taxes are reduced back to zero. The key step of the proof is to show that k LF < . In turn to show this, the key result (derived in the Appendix) is that:
Since as ! 0 both and k LF converge to 0; this means that for small approximately twice as many types trade before if the government intervenes in (0; ) : The intuition is as follows. As we announce the tax plan , some types that were planning to trade in (0; ) now would prefer to trade at 0 even if the price at 0 did not change: The reason is that not taking the price p 0 implies a …xed delay cost. It turns out that the set of types that decide to take that …xed p 0 grows in approximately as fast as does k LF .
The doubling of early trade is then achieved because pooling of trade at time 0 reduces adverse selection faced by buyers and hence price p 0 increases. For small the price is approximately half way between v (0) and v ( ). As the price goes up, even more types prefer to trade at 0 and the adverse selection problem is reduced even further, making p 0 even higher, and so on. Because prices grow at half the speed of v k LF , the resulting cuto¤,
; is twice as high as k LF :
We now consider an opitmal policy that is a Pareto improvement over the laissez faire equilibrium. That is, we ask what mechanism (x (c) ; P (c)) maximizes (4) subject to (5) and constraints:
where U LF (c) is the laissez faire equilibrium payo¤ of type c and U (c) is the payo¤ in the mechanism.
It turns out that the optimal Pareto-improving policy always shares an important feature of this example: an atom of types should trade at time 0: Moreover, in many environments the policy described above is in fact the optimal Pareto-improving policy. We obtain the following characterization:
Theorem 2 (i) For every r > 0; F (c) ; and v (c) ; the optimal Pareto-improving intervention has an atom of types trading at t = 0:
is (weakly) decreasing, then an optimal Pareto-improving intervention can be implemented as a competitive equilibrium with taxes:
so that the subsidy 0 exhausts all the government's budget and H is high enough so that there is no trade for t 2 (0; ) : In equilibrium, types below a threshold c trade at time 0 and types above c trade at the same times and prices as in the laissez-faire economy (so that = t (c ) in the laissez-faire).
Using the envelope theorem, we can express constraints (7) alternatively as For the proof of part (ii), the key step is the observation that the Lagrangean combining the objective function and the budget constraint is strictly decreasing under our assumption that (v (c) c) f (c) is decreasing. It is then optimal that all types for which the Lagrangean is positive trade immediately. For all the other types the Lagrangean is maximized by postponing their trade as much as possible. That delay is limited however by the IR constraints (7) : Without these constraints, Theorem 1 established that optimal mechanism has trade only at time 0 under the weaker regularity assumption. Regularity implies that the Lagrangean crosses zero only once. That is not a su¢ cient condition for the characterization of the Pareto-improving optimal mechanism since the IR constraints require x (c) y (c) > 0 for some types even if the Lagrangean at those types is negative. With the monotonicity of the Lagrangean we can show that it is welfare-improving to increase x (c) for small types and decrease it by the same amount for large types if it allows us to still keep IR constraints satis…ed. Such local variation argument pushes the IR constraints to be satis…ed exactly for all types for which the Lagrangean is negative. So the optimal allocation is x (c) = 1
for types c c and x (c) = y (c) for all higher types. Finally, c is such that all budget is spent at the trade at time zero and the price is high enough that type c is indi¤erent between trading at that price and waiting till t (c ) to trade at v (c ) : This allocation can be implemented with the tax policy described above. The left panels of Figure 5 above illustrate for the case F (c) = c and v (c) = 1+c 2 the payo¤s and optimal policy without the constraint of having to make each type at least as well o¤ as in the laissez faire economy. The panels on the right show how the policy and payo¤s are modi…ed to ensure the intervention is a Pareto improvement. L P (c) and L (c) are respectively the derivatives of the Lagrangean with and without the additional constraint that the policy must lead to a Pareto improvement.
Jump Starting the Market
We now show via an example that if the adverse selection problem is su¢ ciently severe, even the best budget-neutral intervention is incapable of generating any trade. Consider the This example satis…es the regularity condition. Hence, Theorem 1 implies that the optimal budget-neutral intervention would induce trade only at t = 0: Unfortunately, as in Akerlof's original example, even if there is only one opportunity to trade, we get complete unraveling. 17 This follows since the equilibrium cuto¤ type must satisfy:
= p 0 but the zero-pro…t condition is
Since Since the buyers still break-even, every dollar the government spends increases the welfare of the sellers by 2 dollars, one from the direct transfer and one from the improvement in the e¢ ciency of the market (if b > 1 16 ; the marginal e¤ect is even higher). Thus, if the deadweight loss associated with raising taxes from other markets is not too large, bailouts are welfare-improving.
Remark 1 It is important to note that the exact form of the intervention is not important, as long as it leads to the same discounted probability of trade and gives the same surplus to the lowest type. 18 A proportional subsidy, as assumed for concreteness in the paper, or a government guarantee on the payo¤ of the assets, as implemented during the crisis with the Public-Private Investment Program for Legacy Assets would have equivalent e¤ects. The outright purchase of assets done with the TARP program is also equivalent as long as we take into account the proceeds in the budgeting for the program, that is, consider just the expected net cost of the program as the government's budget. 19 
Discussion
In this Section we discuss three important additional considerations. First we extend our model to account for the possibility of additional sellers arriving after t = 0:In this case the optimal policy involves controling the price in the market rather than the times at which the market is open. Next we point out that if the government cannot commit, it might want to use its budget constraint as a way to induce commitment to high taxes in the future by spending resources at t = 0: Lastly, we discuss the importance of the government acting quickly since delayed interventions can be welfare reducing.
Arrival of Additional Sellers.
Thus far we have assumed that all the sellers are present at time zero. A natural concern, particularly when the optimal policy calls for allowing trade only at t = 0; is what happens when we account for the possibility that additional sellers can arrive at latter dates.
We thus augment our model by assuming that additional sellers with a mass of size m t might arrive (stochastically or deterministically) over time. We assume that all of the sellers' types, regardless of their time of arrival, are drawn from the same type distribution F (c) :
Theorem 3 Suppose sellers of mass m t arrive to the market at a Poisson rate t . If the environment is regular, the optimal budget-balanced (on average) mechanism can be implemented with a government program in which the government o¤ers to buys all securities in the market at a constant p (and does not allow trade at higher prices in the market).
If the government does not have a budget then it can simply decentralize the optimal pol- 18 Similar to what we know from the Revenue Equivalence Theorem. 19 As we discussed in the Introduction, the government proceeds can either come from holding the assets to maturity or alternatively from creating a portfolio and selling its shares.
icy by restricting the price in the market to p : With a budget it can decentralize it with a combination of a …xed market price and a proportional subsidy.
Proof. Consider a relaxed problem in which arrivals are observable and the government can design cohort-speci…c policies. That is, the government chooses for each cohort, conditional on it arriving at time t; policy x t (c) (and the corresponding P t (c)) to maximize:
where 1 t is the indicator function for the arrival at time t and the expectations are over the arrival times of the new sellers. The Lagrangean of this problem is:
It is immediate that the optimal allocation x t (c) the same for all times of arrivals. Since the environment is regular, by Theorem 1 it has the bang-bang property: x t (c) = 1 for c below a threshold c and x t (c) = 0 above c (and the threshold is constant over time). A way to implement this constant trading threshold is to set a constant price p = c . Under this policy, arriving sellers would either sell immediately or not at all. Hence this policy remains optimal even if the government cannot condition on the arrival times.
The proof can be trivially extended to uncertain mass of arriving sellers (i.e., m t being a random variable) or to a deterministic problem. The optimal price is set in a way to exhaust the budget on average. It is important for the policy that the government controls the private market, not allowing trades at prices higher than p since otherwise, if the arrival time of a seller was observed by the market, the high types would be able to get a better price after some delay, undermining the optimal mechanism. In other words, even though the optimal mechanism now has trade potentially in every period, it still is optimal to restrict trade in the private markets.
We …nish by pointing out that Thereom 3 is related to Sobel (1991) who studies a monopoly problem under commitment with the arrival over time of new consumers from a common constant distribution. He shows that the optimal monopoly price is constant over time.
Our result is similar, but it requires additional assumptions about the distribution of types and gains from trade (the regularity condition) because our problem is di¤erent, involving correlated values between buyers and sellers and balancing the inter-temporal budget. In other settings, that distinction can lead to very di¤erent outcomes. 20 
Commitment via the Budget
An important assumption in our model is that the government can commit to future taxes.
This assumption is important since indeed after trade has taken place at time zero the government would like to revise its tax policy to allow trade to take place again. A full analysis of the case without commitment is left for future work but we would like to illustrate with an example how the budget constraint can serve as a commitment device.
Consider in particular our example from Section 3 with F (c) = c and v (c) = 1+c 2 : This example satis…es our regularity condition and hence the optimal policy would have trade take place only at time t = 0: Assuming the government has no resources (b = 0) the equilibrium would entail p = 2=3 and c = 2=3: The government would be tempted to lower the taxes and let trade take place again after time zero. Indeed, if the sellers expected this they would trade very di¤erently at t = 0: Now suppose the government had at least commitment to satisfy its budget. Then the government could pick the taxes that would maximize the government's tax proceeds in the future, borrow against them and spend all the money subsidizing trades at t = 0. The government would thus need to indeed keep the taxes at in order to be able to repay its debts. In this way the government still induces a lot of trade to take place at t = 0 and can obtain about half of the welfare gains they could have obtained with full commitment.
The Cost of Delaying Interventions
In practice it might take time for the government to act upon a crisis. In this section we show that speed is often of the essence. Not only is it usually optimal to act immediately, as established by Theorem 1, but delayed interventions can actually decrease surplus compared to the laissez-faire equilibrium. In particular, we show that if the government is expected to provide a bailout at some future time, it slows down (or even shuts down) trade before.
Even though the bailout has a positive direct e¤ect on e¢ ciency, it creates also this negative endogenous/equilibrium e¤ect of delay due to anticipation. The net e¤ect can be negative:
the equilibrium welfare with a delayed subsidy can be lower than absent any intervention.
We show this claim via two examples using the benchmark example from Section 3: v (c) = 1+c 2 and F (c) = c. We consider …rst the case of a deterministic date for the intervention and then the case when the timing of the intervention is uncertain.
Delayed Interventions at Announced Date
Consider the following policy:
The government has a dynamic budget constraint e rT sp T jK T j b; where jK T j is the measure of types that trade at T and p T is the market price buyers pay at T; so that the left hand side is the time-zero present value of the total subsidy at T:
For any b > 0 there exists a T such that if T T there is no trade in equilibrium until T since all sellers prefer to wait for the subsidy than to trade immediately. In this range of T the competitive equilibrium has atom of trade at T followed by smooth trading as in the laissez-faire equilibrium. The following conditions pin down the equilibrium for T T . 21 First, denote by the highest type trading at T: This type has to be indi¤erent between trading at the subsidized price and trading after the subsidy is removed:
where the second equality follows because after T the equilibrium coincides with the laissezfaire equilibrium with a boundary condition k T = (and hence the zero-pro…t condition with smooth trading implies p t = v (k t )): The zero-pro…t condition for prices at T is:
Finally, the budget constraint is:
From these equations (using v (c) and F (c) from the benchmark example) we obtain:
Assuming that b is small enough that < 1; after T trade is smooth and we can use the characterization of the laissez-faire equilibrium in Section 3 to compute:
Inverting it yields the time at which types k > trade:
That completes the characterization of the equilibrium. 22 Present value of the gains from trade in equilibrium is:
Since b = 0 corresponds to no intervention, we have S (0; T ) = S LF = 1 6 : How does delay, T; a¤ect gains from trade? 23 There are two opposing e¤ects. On one hand, later subsidy implies that there is more delay until the market starts trading at T:
On the other hand, since the unused budget earns interest, it allows for more e¢ cient trade at T and afterwards. It turns out that in our benchmark case the …rst force is stronger. In particular, for b > 0 and T T and 2 p be T r < 1 we get the following result:
Proposition 2 Assume v (c) = 1+c 2 and F (c) = c: 1) Despite the government being able to save at rate r; the equilibrium welfare is decreasing in T; @S(b;T ) @T < 0.
2) Moreover, there exists T < T such that the subsidy delayed by more than T destroys surplus, that is S (b; T ) < S LF for T 2 T ; T :
In words, delay is costly despite the budget growing with delay. Even more surprisingly, the second part of the proposition states that the decrease in the surplus can be so large as to drive the total surplus below the surplus with no intervention. 
Delayed Interventions with Uncertain Timing
In practice the market might expect the possibility of a government subsidy but be uncertain about its timing. We argue that this creates incentives to wait for the arrival of the intervention and may be detrimental to welfare even taking into account the bene…ts of the subsidy if it materializes.
To illustrate this problem, we analyze a model in which the government intervention arrives at a random time as a Poisson process with intensity : Suppose that when it …nally intervenes, the government subsidizes trade su¢ ciently that all types trade (by o¤ering su¢ cient subsidy for p t (1 + s) = 1):
The equilibrium dynamics depend crucially on the level of : If is small, there will be trade even before the government subsidy arrives. If it is high, the market will shut down completely until the arrival of the subsidy.
We start with the …rst, more interesting case. If < r; then trade is smooth until arrival of the subsidy. Equilibrium cuto¤s k t are characterized by the following di¤erential equation
(with a boundary condition k 0 = 0):
The left-hand side is the familiar discounting cost of not taking the price today. The …rst term on the right-hand side is the familiar increase in price in case the intervention does not arrive (as before, both use the zero-pro…t condition p t = v (k t )): The new term is the last term on the right-hand side: by delaying trade, the current cuto¤ type can hope to receive the subsidized price 1 instead of the non-subsidized price v (k t ) :
A higher has two opposing welfare e¤ects. The direct e¤ect is that it speeds up the arrival of the subsidy, which increases welfare. The indirect, equilibrium e¤ect, is that it slows down trade before arrival and it decreases welfare (the indirect e¤ect can be seen from
Connecting this observation to real-life events, market participants' beliefs that Federal
Reserve and/or the US Treasury would intervene in some …nancial markets, might have contributed to the reduction of trade volume in some of the those markets after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. While asymmetric information was likely the primary culprit, the expectations of future actions could make it worse.
Using v (c) and F (c) from the benchmark example, the di¤erential equation (8) simpli…es to:
After solving it and computing total welfare, we can show that the negative, indirect e¤ect always dominates (unless is so high that the market shuts down completely):
Assume v (c) = 1+c 2 and F (c) = c: Suppose the government subsidy that induces …rst-best trade arrives at a Poisson rate : 1) If < r; there is trade in equilibrium even before the subsidy arrives and the equilibrium welfare is strictly decreasing in :
2) If > r then the market shuts down in the anticipation of the subsidy and equilibrium welfare is increasing in (as ! 1 the surplus converges to …rst-best). In that range, the surplus is higher than the laissez-faire equilibrium surplus if and only if is su¢ ciently higher than r.
In words, over a large range of arrival rates, the expectation of the possibility of arrival reduces welfare in our benchmark example. In fact, for the delayed subsidy to have a hope at improving welfare, the arrival rate has to be su¢ ciently high so that the market closes down completely. The intuition behind the second part of the above proposition is straightforward. For su¢ ciently large there will not be any trade until the government intervenes. Hence, there is only the …rst, direct e¤ect. Since equilibrium surplus is continuous in and it decreases from S LF as increases from 0 to r; it has to increase su¢ ciently more to recover back to S LF .
Conclusions
In this paper we have analyzed government interventions in a dynamic market with asymmetric information. Our main …nding is that even without the use of subsidies, e¢ ciency can be improved over the laissez-faire equilibrium. Setting high taxes for a short period, after an initial tax-exempt auction or trading window, induces more sellers to trade early and enhances e¢ ciency. High taxes induce more seller types to trade early. This bunching improves the average quality which in turn leads to higher prices. As prices increase, even more types are willing to trade early generating further welfare improvements.
Remarkably, under a fairly commonly used regularity condition, the optimal government policy is to set high taxes for t > 0; e¤ectively shutting down private markets. Of course these results have to be interpreted with caution. As we show there might be natural reasons to depart from this recomendation. First, this recommendation leads to both winners and lossers and can therefore lack the support necessary to be implemented. Instead, a short closure can actually be Pareto improving. That is, all seller types are made better o¤. We also show that if more sellers could arrive at latter dates it would no longer be optimal to have high taxes for t > 0 but rather to control the market price. By keeping the price constant, the buyers, regardless of when they arrive, e¤ective see only one opportunity for trade. This leads to the same bunching achieved via high taxes but with the necessary ‡exibility to accomodate future arrivals.
Freeing the government from the requirement that its intervention must be budget-neutral, i.e. allowing for bailouts, can be very valuable. 24 Moreover, although the particular form in which the subsidy is provided is not important, its timing is. Subsidies can greatly enhance welfare when provided immediately or quickly after the shock, but they can even destroy surplus if they are delayed.
Appendix
Equilibrium computation for Initial Subsidy followed by a Constant Permanent Tax:
The equilibrium conditions are as follows. First, cuto¤ type at time 0; k 0 + ; must be indi¤erent between pooling with lower types and getting the initial subsidized price p 0 ; or waiting an instant to separate from them and getting a higher price but being taxed:
where the maximization captures the two possibilities: there will either be trade after t = 0 (with buyers paying p 0 + = v ( )) or no trade at all.
Second, the buyer zero pro…t condition at time t = 0 is:
The unique solution to (9) and (10) pins down the equilibrium and price p 0 given (s; ) :
Third, if there is any more trade after time t = 0 (i.e. if is not too high) it must be smooth. The same reasoning as in the laissez-faire equilibrium holds after time zero.
Equilibrium is then pinned down by the sellers'indi¤erence condition:
and the zero-pro…t condition p t = v (k t ) : Using the assumed form of v (c) and given a boundary condition , the unique solution of this di¤erential equation is:
Inverting it, we get the following expression for the time at which each cuto¤ type k trades:
Note that because of the tax, types such that (1 ) v (c) c do not trade in equilibrium.
That completes the characterization of the equilibrium for any (s; ) :
Finally, to verify that in equilibrium the intervention is budget-neutral, we require that for any …xed the subsidy s satis…es:
The unique positive solution (s; ; p 0 ) to (9) ; (10) ; (11) pins down the unique competitive equilibrium in this example. With it we can then calculate the total surplus associated with a given tax rate :
Ommited Proofs:
Proof of Proposition 1. First note that our requirement p t v (k t ) implies that there cannot be any atoms of trade, i.e. that k t has to be continuous. Suppose not, that at time Therefore we are left with processes such that k t is continuous and p t = v (k t ) at any time such that _ k t + > 0: If k t is strictly increasing over time, we need that r (p t k t ) = _ p t : if price was rising faster, current cuto¤s would like to wait, a contradiction. If prices were rising slower, over any time interval starting at s, there would be an atom of types trading at s, another contradiction. So the only remaining possibility is that k t is constant over some interval [s 1 ; s 2 ] : Since the price at s 1 is v (k s 1 ) and the price at s 2 is v (k s 2 ) ; if there is indeed no trade in that time interval, then p s 1 = p s 2 : But then there exist a positive measure of
Since after s 2 there are no atoms of trade, the equilibrium continuation payo¤ of types k > k s 1 is smaller than 1 e r(s 2 s 1 ) k + e r(s 2 s 1 ) v (k) since these types trade at price v (k) but later than t = s 2 : Since v (k) is continuous, there exists an " such that types k 2 [k s 1 ; k s 1 + "] would strictly prefer to trade at t = s 1 than to follow the postulated equilibrium. That leads to the …nal contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 1. We use mechanism design to establish the result. The mechanism designer chooses a direct revelation mechanism that maps reports of the sellers to a probability distribution over times they trade and to transfers from the buyers to the mechanism designer and from the designer to the sellers. The constraints on the mechanism are: incentive compatibility for the sellers (to report truthfully); individual rationality for the sellers and buyers (sellers prefer to participate in the mechanism rather than hold the asset forever and the buyers do not lose money on average); and that the mechanism designer does not lose money on average.
Using the regularity condition, we characterize a direct mechanism that maximizes discounted gains from trade. We then show that if the environment is regular, the postulated policy has a corresponding equilibrium that implements the outcome of this best mechanism.
An optimal mechanism leaves the buyers with no surplus (since he could reduce the payment to the buyers and use the savings to increase e¢ ciency of trade). Hence, we can focus on general direct revelation mechanisms described by 2 functions, x (c) and P (c) ; where x (c)
is the discounted probability of trade over all possible trading times and P (c) is the transfer received by the seller. Letting G t (c) denote for a given type the distribution function over the times of trade:
Since all players are risk neutral, the mechanism depends on G t only via x (c) :
The objective function of the mechanism designer is to maximize
We now describe the constraints.
The seller's value function in the mechanism is:
Using the envelope theorem:
Seller IR constraint is U (c) c and in the optimal mechanism it binds at c = 1. 25 Incentive compatibility for the sellers requires that the envelope formula (15) holds and that
x (c) is weakly decreasing.
Since the buyers are willing to pay at most
the budget constraint of the seller is:
From (13) ; we can write P (c) as:
Substituting this to the left-hand-side of the budget constraint we get express it as a function of the allocation alone:
We can use (15) and integration by parts to write the last term as 25 Since U 0 (c) = 1 x (c) 1; if the IR constraint is satis…ed at c = 1; it is satis…ed for all types. IR binds at c = 1 since otherwise the mechanism designer could reduce P (c) by a constant and still satisfy all constraints.
to obtain the …nal form of the budget constraint:
The …rst term of the constraint is the revenue the designer can obtain from the buyers and the second term is the information rent he has to pay the sellers to participate in the mechanism.
We now optimize (12) subject to (16) ; ignoring necessary monotonicity of x (c) that assures that reporting c truthfully is incentive compatible (we check later that it is satis…ed in the solution).
The derivative of the Lagrangian with respect to x (c) is:
where > 0 is the Lagrange multiplier. 26 Note that L (c) is (weakly) positive for
is decreasing (which is our regularity assumption). Then L (c) crosses zero only once because An optimal x (c) is then:
Since x (c) is monotone, a mechanism with this allocation (and appropriate P (c)) is incentive compatible.
That describes the optimal allocation in the relaxed problem: there exists a c such that types below c trade immediately and types above it never trade. The higher the c ; the higher the gains from trade.
The largest c that satis…es the budget constraint (16) is the largest solution of:
since the LHS is the IR constraint of the buyers and the RHS is the IR constraint of the c 26 is strictly positive in the solution since otherwise the budget constraint would not be binding and we would get x (c) = 1 for all c (…rst-best), but that would violate 16.
seller.
A tax policy 0 = 0 and t = H for t > 0 clearly induces an equilibrium such that there is trade only at time zero and that equilibrium satis…es (17) for some c . To …nish the proof, we need to show that the solution to (17) exists and if the environment is strictly regular, the solution is unique. 1) Existence. To see that there exists at least one solution to (17) note that
is continuous in k; positive at k = 0 and negative at k = 1: So there exists at least one solution.
2) Uniqueness. To see that there is a unique solution under the regularity assumption, note that the derivative of (18) at any k is
When we evaluate it at points where (17) holds, the derivative is
and that is by assumption decreasing in k:
Suppose that there are at least two solutions and select two: the lowest k L and secondlowest k H : Since k L is the lowest solution, at that point the curve ( 
Step 1: Characterizing lim !0 @ @ :
Consider policy :
First notice that since t = > 0 for t 2 (0; ] and t = 0 for t > ; for small there cannot be any trade in t 2 (0; ]: Suppose not. Let k be the supremum over types that trade in that time interval: All types that trade in that interval get a payo¤ no higher than (1 ) v (k ) (buyers would lose money if they paid more than p = v (k ) ; the government takes of that price, and the best case scenario is that they trade with no delay).
For small ; that payo¤ is smaller than (1 e r )k + e r v (k ) : Since p + v (k ) ; all types that trade in (0; ] would be strictly better o¤ waiting for the tax to be removed, a contradiction.
When the taxes are removed after t = ; the continuation equilibrium is unique and is characterized in Proposition 1 albeit with a di¤erent starting lowest type. Namely, for t > :
with a boundary condition:
The break even condition for buyers (1E) at t = 0 implies:
Seller optimality (2E) implies that type must be indi¤erent between trading at this price at t = 0 and selling for p + = v ( ) at t = :
v ( ) p 0 = 1 e r (v ( ) )
Combining these two conditions we get that is a solution to:
For small this equation has a unique solution. Using implicit function theorem we can
show that:
(because we have assumed that f (c) and v (c) are positive and continuous). So the bene…t of waiting, the left-hand side of (19) ; is approximately v( ) v(0)
2
; while the cost of waiting, the right-hand side of (19) ; is
which yields @ @ = 2rv(0) v 0 (0) as ! 0:
Step 2: Characterizing lim !0 @k LF @ :
Consider the laissez-faire economy. Since k t is de…ned by the di¤erential equation
for small :
and more precisely:
Summing up steps 1 and 2, we have:
lim !0 @ @ = 2 lim !0 @k LF @ which implies the claim.
Step 3: Pareto Improvement Take any such that there is no trade in t 2 (0; ] under and that k LF < : Since all types c > trade at the same price but sooner in the market with than in the laissez-faire economy, it is immediate that they all prefer the former.
Type c = also strictly prefers : while he is trading at t = 0, he has the option to trade at p = v ( ) at t = while in the laissez-faire economy he trades at the same price but later. By revealed preference he is strictly better o¤ under :
Finally consider any type c < : All these types get the same payo¤ under :
]] for all c :
On the other hand, it is immediate that in the laissez-faire economy the equilibrium payo¤ is weakly increasing in type (by revealed preference, type c 0 can trade at the same time and price as any type c < c 0 and since c 0 gets a higher payo¤ ‡ow from holding his asset, his payo¤ from this strategy is at least as high as type's c): Combining these observations yields: 
We refer to these Pareto-improvement constraints as "IR constraints." Note that the IR constraint for type c depends only on the allocations for types c 0 > c; changing the allocations for lower types does not a¤ect it.
For part (i) of the theorem, note that for small c; v (c) c F (c) f (c) > 0: Hence, setting x (c) = 1 increases the objective function while relaxing the budget constraint and all the IR constraints. Hence, there is a range of types (at the very least those with v (c) c F (c) f (c) > 0; but possibly more), for which the optimal Pareto-improving mechanism sets x (c) = 1:
For part (ii) de…ne
where is the Lagrange-multiplier on the budget constraint. 27 Note that L P (c) is strictly decreasing since > 0 and we assumed that (v (c) c) f (c) is weakly decreasing.
We can re-state the optimization problem as: 
x (c) weakly decreasing, where U (1) U LR (1) :
We claim that the optimal solution to (21) is = 0 and:
x (c) = 1 for c c y (c) for c > c where c is the largest solution to:
so that the budget constraint is binding.
Let ( ; x (c)) be the optimal mechanism and without loss of generality assume that x (c) is a càdlàg (right continuous with left limits) function. There are two parts to establish our claim:
Step 1: In the optimal mechanism = 0:
Step 2: Given = 0; in the optimal mechanism x (c) = y (c) for all c > c ; and x (c) = 1 for all c < c ; where c satis…es L P (c ) = 0.
Step 1: so we get a strict improvement since (1) < L P (c) for any c < 1: Therefore, setting > 0 cannot be optimal.
Suppose by contradiction that
Step 2: Let x (c) be the optimal (càdlàg) solution of (21) with the corresponding Lagrange multiplier : Let c be the unique solution to L P (c) = 0. For types c < c it is clearly optimal to set x (c) = 1 since it would relax the IR constraints and make the objective function higher. Now, suppose that the optimal x (c) 6 = y (c) for a range of types. Then there must exist a range of types above c for which the IR constraints are slack. Let c 1 > c be the supremum of c such that the IR constraints are slack. That implies that c 1 is the supremum over types such that x (c) > y (c) and for all c > c 1 it must be that x (c) = y (c) since = 0 and the IR constraints bind. Note that the IR must bind at c = c since otherwise we could reduce x (c) in the neighborhood of (c ; c + ") and improve the objective function. 29 Therefore, there exist constants c 1 > c 2 c 3 > c 4 such that:
x which is decreasing in :
For the second part, when > r; total surplus is S ( ) = 1 4 r + since upon arrival the government induces the …rst-best surplus which is 1 4 in our benchmark example.
